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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of strategic behaviour 
of referees on the quality and efficiency of peer review. 
We modelled peer review as a process based on 
knowledge asymmetry and subject to evaluation bias. 
We built two simulation scenarios to investigate large-
scale implications of referee behaviour and judgment 
bias. The first one was inspired by “the luck of the 
reviewer draw” idea. In this case, we assumed that 
referees randomly fell into Type I and Type II errors, 
i.e., recommending submissions of low quality to be 
published or recommending against the publishing of 
submissions which should have been published. In the 
second scenario, we assumed that certain referees tried 
intentionally to outperform potential competitors by 
underrating the value of their submissions. We found 
that when publication selection increased, the presence 
of a minority of cheaters may dramatically undermine 
the quality and efficiency of peer review even compared 
with a scenario purely dominated by “the luck of the 
reviewer draw”. We also found that peer review 
outcomes are significantly influenced by differences in 
the way scientists identify potential competitors in the 
system.
INTRODUCTION
Pressures towards competition have recently increased
in science, with scientists harshly competing for funds 
and reputation at a national and international level (e.g., 
Fanelli 2010). The digitalization of scientific 
publications and the development of scientometrics now 
permit to measure the scientist’s performance through a
variety of indicators, such as the impact factor, the “h
index” and so on. By objectively ranking everyone, 
these measures allow us to compare our respective 
achievements and better identify potential competitors.
Although specificities of standards exist even between 
sister disciplines, the strength of quantitative rankings is 
especially strong in the realm of the so-called “hard 
sciences”, whereas it is certainly less true for the 
humanities, where objective measures are hardly 
systematically applicable.  
The increasing importance of performance indicators 
requires to understand whether competitive spirits of 
scientists could influence the peer review process. For 
instance, referees could be tempted to exploit 
strategically their important gatekeepers’ position to
outperform potential competitors (Thurner and Hanel 
2011; Grimaldo and Paolucci 2013; Callahan 2004).
Indeed, while the debate on misbehaviour followed by 
submission authors has gained momentum, even in the 
media, less is known about the possible effect of referee 
behaviour (e.g., Bornmann 2011). On the one hand, as 
shown by the recent Stapel scandal, unfair scientists 
might profit from information asymmetry of referees 
and editors by manipulating experimental data and 
overselling their results. In doing so, they gain 
competitive advantages against fair colleagues (Crocker 
and Crooper 2011). On the other hand, referees could 
be induced to deliberately underrate potential 
competitors by providing unfair judgment, especially 
when possible publication of work by these colleagues 
does not have positive effects on their own reputation 
(e.g., in terms of citations), includes results that 
challenge referees’ work or increases reputation of 
competing research groups for funding. 
Our paper aims to examine these problems by 
proposing a modeling approach that looks at scientist 
behaviour in the peer review process to understand 
complex macro implications (e.g., Edmonds et al. 2011;
Roebber and Schultz 2011; Thurner and Hanel 2011; 
Allesina 2012; Payette 2012; Squazzoni and Gandelli 
2012). We modelled a population of agents interacting 
as authors and referees in a selective science system. 
Following Thurner and Hanel (2011) and Grimaldo and 
Paolucci (2013), we tested macro implications of unfair 
referee behaviour for the quality of peer review. Unlike
these studies, we also considered efficiency problems 
and focused on aggregate consequences in terms of 
system’s resource allocation and growth inequality.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In the second 
section, we introduce the model and the simulation 
parameters, while in the third we present our simulation 
scenarios. In the fourth one, results are illustrated, 
while, in the concluding section, we present a summary 
of results and draw some implications for the current 
debate on peer review.
THE MODEL
Following Squazzoni and Gandelli (2012; 2013), we
assumed a population of N scientists (N = 200) 
randomly selected each to playfill one of two roles: 
author or referee. The task of an author was to submit an 
article with the goal of having it accepted to be 
published. The task of a referee was to evaluate the 
quality of author submissions. As informed by the 
referees’ opinion, only the best submissions were 
published (i.e., those exceeding the publication rate).
We gave each agent a set of resources which were
initially homogeneous (Ra=1). Resources were a proxy
of academic status, position, experience, and scientific 
achievement. The guiding principle was that the more 
scientists published, the more resources they had access 
to, and thus the higher their academic status and 
position.
We assumed that resources were needed both to 
submit and review an article. With each simulation step, 
agents were endowed with a fixed amount of resources
f, equal for all (e.g., common access to research 
infrastructure and internal funds, availability of PhD. 
students, etc.). They then accumulated resources 
according to their publication score. 
We assumed that the quality of submissions varied 
and was dependent on agent resources. Each agent had 
resources   , from which we derived an expected 
submission quality  as follows:
 =       + 1                                          (1)
where v indicated the velocity at which the quality of 
the submission increased with the increase of author 
resources. For instance, this means that for v =  0.1 each
agent needed Ra = 10 to reach a medium-sized expected 
quality submission ( = 0.5).
We assumed that authors varied in terms of the 
quality of their output depending on their resources. 
More specifically, the quality of submissions by authors 
followed a standard deviation 	 which proportionally 
varied according to agent resources and followed a 
normal distribution N(, 	). This means that, with some 
probability, top scientists could write average or low 
quality submissions, and average scientists had some 
chance to write good submissions. 
We assumed that successful publication multiplied 
author resources by a value m, which varied between 
1.5 for less productive published authors and 1 for more
productive published authors. We assigned a 
heterogeneous value of m after various explorations of 
the parameter space. This was seen as mimicking
reality, where publication is crucial in explaining
differences in scientists’ performance, but is more 
important for scientists at the initial stages of their 
academic careers and cannot infinitely increase for top 
scientists. Thus, the resources of published authors grew 
accordingly, leading to subsequent submissions of 
presumably higher quality. If not published, following 
the “winner takes all” rule characterizing science, we 
assumed that authors lost all resources invested prior to 
submitting.
The chance of being published was determined by 
evaluation scores assigned by referees. The value of 
author submissions was therefore not objectively 
determined (i.e., it did not perfectly mirror the real 
quality of submissions), but was instead dependent on 
the referees’ opinion. We assumed that reviewing was a 
resource-intensive activity and that agent resources 
determined both the agent’s reviewing quality and the 
cost to the reviewer (i.e., time lost for publishing their 
own work). The total expense S for any referee was 
calculated as follows:
                                
 =  [1 + (  )]              (2)                   
where Rr was the referee’s resources, Qa was the real 
quality of the author’s submission and r was the 
referee’s expected quality. This last was calculated as in 
equation (1). It is worth noting that, when selected as 
referees, agents not only needed to allocate resources 
toward reviewing but also potentially lost additional 
resources as a result of not being able to publish their 
own work in the meantime.
We assumed that authors and referees were 
randomly matched one to one so that multiple 
submissions and reviews were not possible and the 
reviewing effort was equally distributed among the 
population. We assumed that reviewing expenses grew 
linearly with the quality of authors’ submissions. We 
assumed that, if referees were matched with a 
submission of a quality close to a potential submission 
of their own, they allocated 50% of their available 
resources toward reviewing. They spent fewer resources 
when matched with lower quality submissions, more 
when matched with higher quality submissions. 
Reviewing expenses, however, were proportionally 
dependent on agent resources, meaning that top
scientists would be expected to spend less time 
reviewing in general, as they have more experience and 
are better able to evaluate sound science than average 
scientists are. They will lose more resources than 
average scientists, however, because their time is more 
valuable than the latter.
SIMULATION SCENARIOS
We first built various simulation scenarios to test the 
impact of referee behaviour on the quality and 
efficiency of the peer review process. By quality, we 
meant the ability of peer review to ensure that only the 
best submissions were eventually published (e.g., Casati 
et al. 2009). By efficiency, we meant the ability of peer 
review to achieve quality by minimizing the resources
lost by authors and the expenses incurred by referees.
In the first scenario, called “random behaviour”, we 
assumed that referees had a constant probability of 
being biased in their judgment. When fair, referees had 
the ability to provide a consistent and unequivocal 
opinion which truly reflected the quality of the 
submission. In this case, they did their best to provide 
an accurate evaluation and spent all needed resources 
for reviewing. We assumed that referees estimated the 
authors’ resources following a normal distribution of the 
actual authors’ resources and a narrow standard 
deviation (	 = /10). Then, they estimated the author 
submissions’ quality as in (1). This meant that the 
evaluation scores by fair referees were likely to 
approximate the real value of author submissions, but 
we assumed that there was a chance for some bias in 
order to mimic typical knowledge and information 
asymmetries between authors and referees which 
characterize peer review. 
In the case of unfairness, referees fell into type I and 
type II errors: recommending submissions of low 
quality to be published or recommending against the 
publishing of submissions which should have been
published (e.g., Laband and Piette 1994; Bornmann and 
Daniel 2007). More specifically, when unfair, referees 
spent half of the resources spent by fair referees, and 
under- or over- estimated author submissions. To avoid 
the possibility that referees assigned the real value to 
submissions by chance we assumed that, when they 
underrated a submission, they estimated the authors’ 
resources as described for fair referees, but applying an 
underrating factor to the actual authors’ resources (u =
0.1). An opposite factor was applied in the case of 
overrating (i.e. o = 1.9).
In the second scenario, called “cheating”, we 
assumed that referees intentionally outperformed
potential competitors by systematically underrating their 
submission, even at their own expenses (e.g., resources
spent for reviewing). More specifically, we assumed 
that referees were capable to estimate submission 
authors’ resources (Ra) and identify each author with an 
expected Ra similar or higher than his/her Rr as a 
competitor.
To measure the quality of peer review, we 
considered the percentage of errors made by referees by 
calculating the optimal situation, in which submissions 
were published according to their real value, and by 
measuring the discrepancy with the actual situation in 
each simulation step (e.g., see evaluation bias in Tab. 1).
RESULTS
Tab. 1 shows the impact of referee behaviour on the 
quality and efficiency of peer review under various 
conditions of the publication rate (25%, 50%, and 75% 
of published submissions). Data were averaged across 
10 simulation runs on 200 simulation steps. Results 
indicated that cheating increased evaluation bias
particularly when the selection rate of publication was 
stronger. This also caused higher productivity loss, in 
terms of resources wasted by unpublished authors who 
deserved publication and more considerable reviewing 
expenses. We measured productivity loss as the 
percentage of resources wasted by unpublished authors 
who deserved to be published, while reviewing expenses
were the percentage of resources spent by referees 
compared with the resources invested by submitting 
authors. Obviously, less competitive publication rates
decreased the negative impact of cheating. 
Tab. 2 shows the number of cheaters in the 
population in situations of more or less selective 
publication rate. Results indicated that, in case of 
stronger selection for publication, a percentage of 27% 
of cheaters was sufficient to generate 70.86% of low 
quality published authors who should not deserve 
publication (see also Tab. 1). In case of less selective 
publication rates, even higher probability of cheating 
caused less biased allocation of publications (e.g, 35% 
of cheaters produce 20.07% of evaluation bias under the 
weak selection environment).
Table 1: The impact of referee behaviour on the quality
and efficiency of peer review in various selective 
environments (values in percentage).
Scenario Evaluation 
bias
Productivity 
loss
Reviewing
expenses
Weak selection (75% published submissions)
Random 
behaviour
16.51 7.68 25.98
Cheating 20.07 4,91 21.34
Medium-level selection (50% published submissions)
Random 
behaviour
25.27 14.98 30.77
Cheating 56.63 28.02 32.21
Strong selection (25% published submissions)
Random 
behaviour
29.42 15.00 29.42
Cheating 70.86 34.72 35.24
Table 2: Percentage of cheaters among the referees in 
the “cheating scenario” in various selection rate 
environments (values of cheaters in percentage on the 
total number of referees).
Selection rage Cheaters
Strong selection 0.27
Medium selection 0.28
Weak selection 0.35
We next calculated the resources of all agents at the 
end of the simulation run in each scenario. Figures 1 
and 2 compare system productivity accumulation in 
weakly and strongly publication selection rate. Results 
showed that, in case of stronger competition for 
publication, cheating implied less concentration of 
resources. 
We also considered inequality of resource 
distribution by calculating a Gini index, which typically 
measures the inequality among values of a frequency 
distribution. In our case, inequality meant an unequal 
allocation of resources, such as ideal academic status, 
reputation, and career (see Tab. 3). Results showed that, 
in case of stronger competition for publication, cheating 
caused less inequality of resource allocation in the 
system. The situation was different in case of less 
competition for publication.
Figure 1: The impact of agent behaviour on system 
resource accumulation when competition for publication 
was weak. The “random behaviour” scenario is in 
dotted grey, the “cheating” scenario is in solid black. In 
the x-axis, the resources. In the y-axis, the percentage of 
agents.
Figure 2: The impact of agent behaviour on system 
resource accumulation when competition for publication 
was strong. The “random behaviour” scenario is in 
dotted grey, the “cheating” scenario is in solid black. In 
the x-axis, the resources. In the y-axis, the percentage of 
agents.
Table 3: The Gini index in weak and strong competition 
for publication (values calculated at the end of the 
simulation). The index takes 0 when there was complete 
equality in resource distribution among agents and 1 
when a single agent had everything.
Weak competition for publication Gini index
Random behaviour 0.54
Cheating 0.57
Strong competition for publication Gini index
Random behaviour 0.47
Cheating 0.28
This is coherent with previous findings (e.g., 
Squazzoni and Gandelli 2012): in a competitive, 
“winner takes all” system such as academic science, a
better functioning peer review process determines an 
unequal resource distribution as advantages accrue to 
the best scientists. This can be attributed to the fact that 
the best published authors gain access to more resources 
and more chances to be re-published by taking 
advantage of the fairness of certain referees. It is worth 
noting that this kind of “Saint Matthew effect” (i.e., “the 
rich get richer, the poor get poorer”) has been widely 
acknolwedged in science, from the classical 
contribution by Merton (1973) to recent findings (e.g., 
Barabási, Song and Wang 2012; Tol 2013).
The next step was to consider that competitive 
behaviour of scientists could be influenced by different 
possible ways of identifying potential competitors. For 
instance, in certain scientific communities, especially 
among the so-called “hard sciences”, widely shared 
objective measures exist that help everyone to precisely 
commensurate his/her respective performance with that 
of others. This means that competitors might be 
precisely identified across the whole population. This 
does not hold in other scientific communities, especially 
those revolving around the humanities, where these 
standards do not exist and are even widely contested. In 
these cases, the definition of potential competitors 
depends on the stratification of scientists in local 
groups, with the prevalence of disciplinary or group 
specificities of standards (e.g., Laudel and Gläeser 
2006; Lamont 2009).
We created two supplementary scenarios where we 
modified the way in which cheaters identified their 
competitors. Unlike the previous “cheating” scenario, 
which followed a threshold function to detect possible 
competitors, we tested a “local competition” scenario, 
where this function followed a Gaussian shape and a 
“glass ceiling” scenario, where competitors’ detection 
function followed a logistic shape.
In the first case (“local competition”), we assumed 
that scientists detected possible competitors only in their 
own performance neighbourhood. This was to mimic
certain fragmented scientific communities where 
scientists tend to compete locally. More specifically, we 
assumed that competitor’s detection followed a normal 
distribution (, 	) where Rr was the referee’s
resources and 	 was the standard deviation calculated 
as a proportion of Rr.
In the second case (“glass ceiling”), we assumed that 
scientists tried to similarly outperform the less and the 
more productive colleagues. This was to protect against 
upstart and outperform superior scientists. The shape of 
the logistic function is shown in Fig. 3. 
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Figure 3: The logistic function for competitor detection 
in the“glass ceiling” scenario.
More specifically, the probability  of a referee to 
cheat a submission author followed equation (3), where
d indicated the respective distance of author’s and 
referee's resources (i.e.,  =    ).
 =  1(() +  1)                         (3)  
The constants  and  determined the shape of the 
curve shown in Fig. 3 and were calculated as in the
equations (4) and (5). These equations were related to 
the following three parameters (also shown in Fig. 3): 
 indicated the probability of cheating () when both 
referees and authors had the same amount of resources
(i.e. d=0), and  indicated the probability of cheating 
when the distance between the author's and the referee's 
resources was equal to .
  =  ln 1                                  (4)
  =  
!" #1   $ + 
                  (5)
Compared with the baseline scenario (i.e., threshold 
function), results showed that “local competition”
scenario ensured less bias independently of the 
publication selection rates. In case of higher selection 
rate for publication, this scenario also guaranteed higher 
efficiency in terms of minimization of wasted resources 
for authors and reviewing expenses.
On the other hand, the “glass ceiling” scenario 
determined levels of bias and unefficiency similar to the 
baseline scenario. This means that the logistic function 
for competitor’s detection performed similarly to the 
threshold one.
Table 4: The impact of different competition detection 
scenarios on the quality and efficiency of peer review in 
various selective environments (values in percentage).
Scenario Evaluation 
bias
Productivity
loss
Reviewing
expenses
Weak selection (75% published submissions)
Cheating 20.07 4.91 21.34
Local 
competition
14.65 4.21 22.56
Glass ceiling 16.67 3.68 21.66
Medium-level selection (50% published submissions)
Cheating 56.63 28.02 32.21
Local 
competition
33.86 18.39 30.97
Glass ceiling 43.06 15.30 23.16
Strong selection (25% published submissions)
Cheating 70.86 34.72 35.24
Local 
competition
31.04 15.63 30.13
Glass ceiling 70.35 34.70 34.56
Tab. 5 shows the number of cheaters in the 
population. For shortage of space, we reported only the 
case of strong competition for publication. Results 
showed, first, that the “glass ceiling” scenario 
determined higher number of cheaters. Secondly, they 
showed that although “local competition” scenario 
included a considerable percentage of cheaters (i.e., 
20%), this did not have a negative effect on the quality 
of peer review. In case of strong competition for 
publication, 20% of cheaters caused only 31% of biased
judgment.  
Table 5: Percentage of cheaters among the referees in
various competitor detecting scenarios with strong 
competition for publication (values of cheaters in 
percentage on the total number of referees).
Scenario Cheaters
Cheating 0.27
Local competition 0.20
Glass ceiling 0.34
Figure 4 and Tab. 6 show the impact of various 
cheating mechanisms on the growth and distribution of 
resources in the case of strong competition for 
publication. Results showed that “cheating” and “glass 
ceiling” scenarios generated similar outcomes, whereas 
“local competition” implied higher inequality of 
resource distribution.
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Figure 4: The impact of cheating on system resource 
accumulation in strongly selective environments. The 
“cheating behaviour” scenario is in dotted grey, the 
“local competition” scenario is in solid black and the 
“glass ceiling” scenario is in solid gray. In the x-axis, 
the resources. In the y-axis, the percentage of agents.
Table 6: The Gini index in the “local competition” and 
the “glass ceiling” scenarios in strongly selective 
environments (values calculated at the end of the 
simulation). The index takes 0 when there was complete 
equality in resource distribution among agents and 1 
when a single agent had everything.
Scenario with strong selection Gini index
Cheating 0.28
Local competition 0.46
Glass ceiling 0.29
CONCLUSIONS
Previous computational studies have indicated that even 
a small proportion of referee cheating may dramatically 
distort the publication quality (Thurner and Hanel 
2011). Our results confirmed these findings but also 
permitted us to consider implications of cheating for the 
system’s resource allocation in terms of growth 
dynamics and distribution inequality. Furthermore, we 
found that peer review outcomes are sensitive to 
differences in the way scientists identify their 
competitors. Certain mechanisms, such as the 
stratification of scientists in local competing groups and 
the presence of niches of competition, might reduce the 
negative effect of cheating on the quality of the peer 
review process as scientists can develop more 
competent judgment.
It is important to outline that making any strong 
generalisation on peer review from these simulation 
studies is inappropriate. Developments that integrate 
theoretical models and empirical data are fundamental 
both to test aggregate findings and realistically calibrate 
important model parameters. However, it must be also 
said that computational models of peer review allow us 
to pinpoint the importance of considering micro-
behavioural and interaction aspects, which are 
unfortunately difficult to look at empirically (Squazzoni 
and Takács 2011). 
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